

Inverting the Army Intelligence Pyramid

**A Monograph
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Abstract

INVERTING THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE PYRAMID by MAJ Christopher C.E. McGarry, U.S. Army, 64 pages.

Lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past ten years indicate that the Army is fighting in an environment that requires a change in how organizations gather, analyze, synthesize, and produce intelligence. “Top-down” intelligence no longer drives today’s operations. Instead, current operations produce numerous lower-level information and intelligence reports that higher headquarters must gather, analyze, and synthesize. The sheer volume of these reports and the depth and breadth of information they provide often exceed the capacity of the intelligence organizations at the various headquarters echelons – particularly those within the brigade combat team (BCT). The particularly high demand for intelligence in today’s operational environment, coupled with the need for operational integration of tactical units, leads to the critical question: does the U.S. Army require intelligence support teams at the company-level in all BCTs?

The methodology consists of a detailed description, analysis, and synthesis of current data collected on intelligence needs and organizational responses to these needs at the company-level throughout the U.S. Army. This research includes case study analysis comparing select brigade combat teams that employed company-level intelligence support teams (CoISTs) with those that did not. A review of historical literature on Army operations reveals a pattern of success among units who had a section of three to eight personnel within the company dedicated exclusively to intelligence analysis.

While this research does not indicate a fundamental change in the nature of war, it does highlight the unique requirements for intelligence collection and analysis in today’s wars. In particular, close interaction between Army units and local populations has led to the generation of vast amounts of information that platoons and companies both collect and exploit. The lack of a dedicated company-level organization to process this information into actionable intelligence highlights the requirement for a refined intelligence structure, including training requirements, equipping needs, and doctrine for both ongoing counterinsurgency operations and future conflicts.

This refinement will improve the effectiveness of Army organizations from the bottom-up, inverting the pyramid to enable tactical units to assess and understand the complex environments in which they operate. In turn, higher echelon units will benefit from this increased understanding at the company level, and the dramatically increased rate at which they can attain that understanding and share it with higher echelons.

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Introduction

Army Chief of Staff General George Casey recently declared that the Army is in an era of persistent conflict, which will likely continue for decades.¹ Lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past nine years indicate that the Army is fighting in an environment that requires a change in how organizations gather, analyze, synthesize, and produce intelligence. In particular, forces fighting an insurgency find killing the enemy a simpler task than identifying and locating the enemy.² Frank Kitson, in his book *Low Intensity Operations*, emphasizes the importance of the intelligence process: "If it is accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding him, it is easy to recognize the paramount importance of good information."³

The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq differ from higher intensity wars, in which higher echelon intelligence sections identify the locations of enemy military units using a variety of sophisticated data collectors, and then provide this intelligence to subordinate units. Armed with this intelligence, subordinate units then attack the opposing forces. During Operation Desert Storm, most of the information available to commanders came "from the numerous collection units directed by Central Command, the Army Intelligence Agency, and other strategic commands."⁴ This sort of "top-down" intelligence no longer drives today's operations.⁵ Instead, current operations produce numerous lower-level information and intelligence reports that higher

¹ George W. Casey, "Eisenhower Luncheon Address," in *AUSA Annual Meeting* (Washington D.C. 2007).

² David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31.

³ Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations. Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping* (London: Faber & Faber, 1971), 95.

⁴ Stephen A. Bourque, *Jayhawk! : The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2002), 97.

⁵ Michael T. Flynn, Matthew Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, "Fixing Intel in Afghanistan," *Marine Corps Gazette* 94(2010): 62.

headquarters must gather, analyze, and synthesize. The sheer volume of these reports and the depth and breadth of information they provide often exceed the capacity of the intelligence organizations at the various headquarters echelons – particularly those within the brigade combat team (BCT).⁶

Operational units require multiple forms of intelligence to achieve success in a counterinsurgency (COIN), and the U.S. Army has changed how it uses these forms of intelligence since September 11, 2001. Joint and Army doctrine define insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The key distinction between an insurgency and other movements is the decision to use violence to achieve political goals.”⁷ Joint and Army doctrine define COIN, the action that a military force takes to oppose an insurgency, as “the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”⁸ This monograph conforms to the *Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02)* definitions of insurgency and COIN, as do the various sources cited.

According to General David Petraeus, “All counterinsurgencies are local and you have to do this village by village and valley by valley.”⁹ For nations to achieve strategic success in disrupting or defeating an insurgency, they must skillfully conduct COIN at the local level, where platoons and companies fight.¹⁰ U.S. Army forces adapted well over the past nine years of the conflict and have optimized their methods to account for the requirements of countering an

⁶ Kyle Teamey and Jonathan Sweet, “Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* 86, no. 5 (2006): 25.

⁷ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2009), 268; U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1.

⁸ *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 130.

⁹ Josh Johnson, “Petraeus Offers Insight in ‘Conversation’ with BYU Community,” *Universe* 2010.

¹⁰ Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, “Fixing Intel in Afghanistan,” 62-63.

insurgency by focusing more effort on local operations and missions. In accordance with the current modus operandi, platoons and companies in both Iraq and Afghanistan conduct independent patrols and missions to defeat local insurgents in their areas of operations.¹¹ To achieve success, these units deploy in small outposts away from large bases, living and working amongst the populace.¹² Due to this deployment of forces, company-level tactical units conduct most of their own intelligence collection, analysis, and targeting without the benefit of formal intelligence training, tools, or access and synthesis from higher-level intelligence analysts and organizations.¹³

Intelligence: Who Collects It and Who Needs It

By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country — the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

The U.S. Army intelligence enterprise organizes by discipline: all-source intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT).¹⁴ Leaders at all levels use these forms of intelligence to make decisions and direct operations. Ultimately, they aim for "intelligence fusion," a process through which multiple intelligence

¹¹ Robert Baird, "COIN: On-the-Job Learning for the New Platoon Leader," *Infantry* 98, no. 1 (2009): 28.

¹² David H. Petraeus, "COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance," (2010); Brian Burton and John Nagl, "Learning as We Go: The US Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 19, no. 3 (2008): 9.

¹³ Michael T. Flynn, Matthew Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," ed. Center for a New American Security (Washington 2010), 13; Teamey and Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency," 25.

¹⁴ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), 1-22.

disciplines confirm a single fact through all-source intelligence.¹⁵ To achieve this fusion, analysts collect vast amounts of information and data from numerous sources. When subjected to an analytical process this mass of information can be refined into intelligence to support a predictive estimate of adversary capabilities and intentions. This predictive quality distinguishes intelligence from the mass of other information available to the commander.¹⁶

According to current U.S. Army intelligence doctrine, “Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is the collection of foreign information by a trained HUMINT collector. It uses human sources and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to collect information including multimedia on threat characteristics.”¹⁷ HUMINT operations are labor intensive and require time, personnel, and the right equipment to process, analyze, and synthesize the mass of information gathered into actionable intelligence.¹⁸ One of the key lessons illustrated by experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is that HUMINT normally provides the majority of actionable intelligence.¹⁹ Much of the intelligence collected in the current fight, though originated at the tactical level, has strategic implications. Therefore, analysts and leaders at the strategic level need to understand the sub-national situation down to the local district level.

Analysts identified human intelligence early in Operation Iraqi Freedom as an area in need of improvement. Anthony Cordesman, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported after visiting the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad in 2003:

¹⁵ *Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2007), XIV. Fusion is the process of collecting and examining information from all available sources and intelligence disciplines to derive as complete an assessment as possible of detected activity

¹⁶ *Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence*, 1-4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1-22.

¹⁸ Ralph Baker, O., "HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment," *Military Review* 87, no. 2 (2007): 16.

¹⁹ Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 99.

The division has had to change its whole operating style after 20 years of focusing on fighting conventional heavy forces. It has had to develop HUMINT procedures and turn away from reliance on technical intelligence sources. Even now it needs twice as many HUMINT teams as it has.

The unit feels that intelligence is the key to success. It was slow to fully organize and create suitable databases, learn how to run sources, find out what sources were reliable and what sources work. A lack of translators and trained intelligence personnel was and is a problem.²⁰

In response to the problems associated with the early inadequacies of HUMINT and other problems within the intelligence enterprise, the U.S. Army plans to increase its military intelligence strength by more than 7,000 soldiers by 2013. The U.S. Army's HUMINT forces will more than double in size, making this larger than any other intelligence discipline.²¹ The inclusion of a HUMINT platoon in the military intelligence company assigned to the BCT represents one of the main benefits of the modularity achieved through the Army Transformation process.²²

Over the last ten years of conflict, the uses of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) have increased significantly. Army doctrine defines GEOINT as “the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.”²³ Separate but tied closely to GEOINT is IMINT. According to the same doctrinal manual, “IMINT is derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, multispectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically,

²⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Current Military Situation in Iraq," (2003), <http://csis.org/publication/current-military-situation-iraq> (accessed January 1, 2011).

²¹ John F. Kimmons, "Transforming Army Intelligence," *Military Review* 86, no. 6 (2006): 70.

²² Ibid.

²³ *Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence*, 1-22.

electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media.”²⁴ Many producers and consumers of both GEOINT and IMINT exist, ranging from the strategic to the tactical.

Counterinsurgency operations have a strong GEOINT component because it helps answer the fundamental questions of where and when a particular event occurred. Through the increased use of computer systems at lower levels, intelligence and products associated with GEOINT and IMINT are now readily available at the lowest tactical units. The days of going to the map warehouse to draw maps for a deployment are long gone. Replacing this is the availability of simpler mapping products such as a geo-referenced portable document format (PDF) or GEOPDF.²⁵ In addition, units at all echelons currently use mapping-software programs including Falcon View, Google Earth®, ArcGIS®, and Maneuver Control System Light (MCS-Light).²⁶ The National Geospatial Agency (NGA), a strategic agency, produces the digital map data these programs require. However, units at platoon level and lower can easily use mapping programs like Falcon View to display up-to-date imagery and maps created at the highest echelons.²⁷ For example, Iraqi security force units have used GEOINT products produced on Falcon View to conduct large-scale operations in Diyala province.²⁸

Despite the strategic agencies’ ability to produce the data needed to utilize mapping software, tactical organizations provide meaning and context to that data. As tactical units conduct patrols, they gather relevant information about the physical and social infrastructure,

²⁴ Ibid., 9-1.

²⁵ Raymond G. Caputo, "The GeoPDF Project: Creating Maps for the Non-Mapper," *Engineer* 40, no. 1 (2010): 36.

²⁶ Brian Walters, "Maps, Digital Made (More) Realistic," *Armada International* 27, no. 6 (2003). ArcGIS is mapping software suite produced by the Esri company.

²⁷ Robert Ackerman, "Geospatial Intelligence Enters New Era," *Signal* 62, no. 10 (2008): 35.

²⁸ James K. Greer, "Operation Knockout: Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *Military Review* (2006): 17.

such as they do when taking a census, something that would be infeasible for higher-level units.²⁹ For example, NGA can provide detailed, color imagery of a neighborhood and each building within it. However, only a tactical unit can talk to the occupants to find out important details like exactly who lives in each home, how long they have lived there, and what their ethnicity is. Once compiled, this data not only helps tactical organizations conduct effective action, but also facilitates operational art and strategy.³⁰

The role and importance of SIGINT have also changed significantly in the past few years. Army doctrine defines SIGINT as “intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.”³¹ The main role of SIGINT aircraft has evolved in the current operational environment from national and theater-strategic intelligence collection of information on enemy air defense and command and control networks to missions like tactical exploitation of radio signals.³² According to Colonel Perry Smith, “there used to be a clear separation between what the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Army were doing in SIGINT, but as we close the gap between national and tactical SIGINT, we are partnering a lot more with NSA.”³³

Due to modernizations within the intelligence community, some previously SIGINT-only platforms will have the ability to provide multiple forms of intelligence through a new capability called the Aerial Common System (ACS). The Army plans for ACS not only to serve as a SIGINT platform, but also to have all-weather ground-moving-target-indication (GMTI), electro-

²⁹ Bryan Frizzelle et al., “Dragoons in Iraq: Combined Census Operations,” *Armor & Cavalry Journal* 2, no. 6 (2009): 41.

³⁰ Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.”

³¹ *Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence*, 12-1.

³² Valery Rousset and Antoine Philippe, “SIGINT Aircraft: Fly High, Listen Closely,” *Armada International* 33, no. 4 (2009): 44.

³³ Glenn Goodman, “Revitalizing Army SIGINT: Service Puts Sound Modernization Plans in Place,” *Journal of Electronic Defense* 31, no. 10 (2008): 52.

optical/infrared (EO/IR), and hyper-spectral measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT).³⁴ GMTI includes capabilities like tracking a moving target on the ground from the aerial Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).³⁵ These advances in SIGINT and MASINT provide a marked enhancement to the information available to tactical units.

Ultimately, staffs fuse all these forms of intelligence together to produce intelligence estimates. The all-source intelligence discipline synthesizes numerous forms of information and intelligence into a coherent product and picture. The most frequently fused forms of intelligence include HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, and open-source data; producing finished intelligence estimates.

These advances in intelligence disciplines show that information previously available mainly to strategic headquarters can now improve the effectiveness of tactical units as well. This availability creates an increased need among tactical units for access to and analysis from these multiple forms of intelligence. Tactical units now have the potential to provide a significant amount of much-needed information to higher-level intelligence organizations.

Research Question and Thesis

“In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible.”³⁶ A thorough knowledge of the environment is paramount.³⁷ Understanding the environment and the sources of conflict requires retrieving and analyzing information consisting of vast quantities of data and many interconnected variables. This does not suggest that

³⁴ Ibid., 54.

³⁵ Kenneth B. Sherman, "Army ISR: Riflemen Get the Picture," *Journal of Electronic Defense* 24, no. 2 (2001): 39.

³⁶ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 31.

³⁷ Christopher Paul, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers : Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 32; Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 30.

conventional war is easy and COIN is difficult. However, these forms of warfare are different, and the intelligence needs in COIN are different from conventional warfare.³⁸ Within a division's area of operations, the nature of the insurgency can vary widely between subordinate units' boundaries.³⁹ The Army's current intelligence structure lacks the capacity at the company-level to deal with this diversity.

Prior to September 11, 2001, company-level units in the conventional forces did not train to conduct COIN as a core task. Rather, the army relied on the Special Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations as a key element of Foreign Internal Defense (FID).⁴⁰ Of their Operational Detachments' (ODAs) twelve men, three to four receive additional training in intelligence planning and analysis (in addition to the team's intelligence sergeant).⁴¹ Researchers and practitioners have demonstrated that counterinsurgency requires a significant amount of intelligence and operational integration.⁴² This logically leads to the conclusion that small-unit conventional forces at the platoon and company-level require additional intelligence capabilities to achieve the same level of effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations as their Special Forces counterparts.

The particularly high demand for intelligence in today's operational environment, coupled with the need for operational integration of tactical units, leads to the critical question: does the U.S. Army require intelligence support teams at the company-level in all BCTs? The following

³⁸ Teamey and Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency," 24.

³⁹ *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 3-1.

⁴⁰ *Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Joint Staff, 1998), II-6.

⁴¹ Lieutenant General (RET) William G. Boykin and Scott Swanson, "Operationalizing Intelligence," *Special Warfare* 21, no. 8 (2008): 24.

⁴² Jeffrey S. Dinsmore, "Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette* 91, no. 7 (2007); Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, "Fixing Intel in Afghanistan."; Michael P. Foley, "Facilitating Intelligence at the Point of Action," *Marine Corps Gazette* 94, no. 3 (2010).

analysis will demonstrate it does, and therefore should formally create an organic intelligence section at the company-level.⁴³ The section should consist of highly trained analysts, equipped appropriately to collect and process information and produce actionable intelligence. These organizations must serve as fully integrated components of higher-level tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence systems. This capability will improve situational understanding and targeting within the brigade combat team and division areas of operations.

Several years of studying, training, and conducting operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level in the current operating environment demonstrate that success in counterinsurgencies lies in a robust intelligence capability at the lowest levels. It is at these lower levels that mission planning and execution occurs, achieving the daily successes or failures in counterinsurgencies. Due to the changing nature of warfare described below and the recent changes resulting from Army transformation, the current structure of tactical intelligence must change to include a CoIST in every company-level organization's organic force structure.

Methodology

Qualitative research provides a detailed description, analysis, and synthesis of current data collected on intelligence needs and organizational responses to these needs at the company-level throughout the U.S. Army. This research includes case study analysis comparing select brigade combat teams that employed company-level intelligence support teams with those that did not. Key research data includes reports from the U.S. Army's Combat Training Centers and oral history interviews of leaders from the selected brigades. Interview subjects include leaders who served in multiple organizations with experience from both of the above-mentioned perspectives. The results of these findings support a proposal for a refined intelligence structure,

⁴³ Hereafter referred to as the Company Intelligence Support Team, or CoIST.

including training requirements, equipping needs, and doctrine for both ongoing counterinsurgency operations and future conflicts.

Background

A review of historical literature on Army operations reveals a pattern of success among units who had a section of three to eight personnel within the company dedicated exclusively to intelligence analysis. The U.S Army's experience in the Philippines and its integration of intelligence at the company-level provides but one historical example of the success of Company Intelligence Support Teams.

Past Small Wars

Throughout history, few wars have exhibited the characteristics of full-scale or total wars. The United States therefore possesses far greater experience in limited war than in wars at the upper end of the spectrum of conflict. For example, the United States Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 describes the prevalence of these types of operations in United States history. The *Small Wars Manual* defines small wars as:

Operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.⁴⁴

Since the 1800s, the United States has deployed more than 180 times to over 37 countries in conflicts that constituted small wars.⁴⁵ Some of America's wars, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, started as large-scale conventional wars, but even these wars soon evolved into

⁴⁴ *Small Wars Manual*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1940), 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

counterinsurgencies.⁴⁶ The changes in our intelligence organizational structure need to reflect the predominant nature of warfare in America's historical experience.

Counterinsurgencies

America's experience fighting insurgencies demonstrates the necessity for company-level units to possess access to actionable intelligence to achieve success in counterinsurgency campaigns. However, the amount of information available often overwhelmed battalion and higher intelligence sections, limiting their ability to develop that information into actionable intelligence. As discussed previously, the United States Army has a long history of involvement in counterinsurgencies or small wars. The United States fought counterinsurgencies during both the Philippine and Indian wars. Throughout the Philippines insurgency, U.S. units occupied platoon-and company--sized outposts that ranged from 50 to 100 men.⁴⁷ The First District area in the northwest corner on the island of Luzon encompassed approximately 8,000 square miles with a population of over 531,000.⁴⁸ Throughout the Philippine insurgency, as the overall requirement for outposts increased, the sizes of the garrisons shrank. By August 1900, the First District area reported a troop strength of only 3,600 men (roughly equivalent to a current Infantry Brigade) spread across at least 36 outposts.⁴⁹ From November 1899 to December 1900, the number of U.S.

⁴⁶ Donald J. Hanle, *Terrorism : The Newest Face of Warfare* (Oxford: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 10-55.

⁴⁷ Robert D. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, Long War Series Occasional Paper (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 45.

⁴⁸ Brian M. Linn, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," *Military Affairs* 51, no. 2 (1987): 63.

⁴⁹ Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, 42-45.

garrisons throughout the Philippines expanded from 53 to over 400.⁵⁰ Even though troops in these garrisons lived amongst the populace, limited intelligence hindered their operational capability during this period.⁵¹

Army leaders in the Philippines took steps early in 1900 to address the lack of actionable intelligence. Brigadier General Samuel M. Young, the commander of First District, placed a great deal of trust in his field officers to execute decentralized operations through a newly devised pacification campaign.⁵² The field commanders used local informants, spies, and native Philippine scouts as a method to gather actionable intelligence, leading to significant improvements after 1900.⁵³ One critical step in intelligence reorganization involved the creation of the Division of Military Information, which translated documents and quickly relayed information back to field units.⁵⁴ However, organizational changes at the higher echelons failed to match the success achieved by improved intelligence gathering and development at the local level.

Brigadier General Frederick Funston, the Fourth District's commander, understood the importance of local intelligence. Funston professed his belief in company-level intelligence: "The efficiency of a company depends largely on its knowledge of the people in the vicinity, and the country itself, which can be acquired only after some time."⁵⁵ Acting on this belief, Funston

⁵⁰ Linn, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," 64.

⁵¹ Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, 57.

⁵² Linn, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon," 64.

⁵³ Andrew. J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 117.

⁵⁴ Brian McAllister Linn, "The Philippines: Nationbuilding and Pacification," *Military Review* 85, no. 2 (2005): 52.

⁵⁵ Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 22.

created a quick strike force called the “Headquarters Scouts,” which acted on previously obtained intelligence and conducted numerous raids against the insurgents. Among other successes, the Headquarters Scouts captured insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo by exploiting actionable intelligence collected at the tactical level. A small group of U.S. Army officers and a Macabebe company (Philippine scouts) used intelligence gleaned from captured documents to locate Aguinaldo’s headquarters. They then infiltrated over one hundred miles into Aguinaldo’s territory and penetrated his security perimeter while avoiding serious resistance.⁵⁶ This tactical success from actionable intelligence gave U.S. forces the upper hand in negotiations, leading to a strategic peace agreement with Aguinaldo’s forces.⁵⁷

Evolving U.S. Army Doctrine

Current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine shows many similarities to the doctrine Andrew J. Birtle analyzed in his 1998 review of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, in which he demonstrated the centrality of actionable intelligence as an ingredient for success.⁵⁸ Today, U.S. Army *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, focuses on this specific form of warfare. The manual supports the need for lower tactical-level intelligence capability. *Field Manual 3-24* asserts that:

Insurgencies are local...The insurgency one battalion faces will often be different from that faced by an adjacent battalion. The mosaic nature of insurgencies, coupled with the fact that *all Soldiers and Marines are potential intelligence collectors*, means that *all echelons both produce and consume intelligence*. This situation results in a bottom-up flow of intelligence.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid., 275.

⁵⁷ Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, 60-64.

⁵⁸ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 82.

⁵⁹ *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 3-1. Emphasis Added.

This recognition of the importance of each individual as an intelligence collector echoes the current U.S Army concept and catchphrase that “Every Soldier is a Sensor.”⁶⁰ *Field Manual 3-24* also discusses the link between intelligence and operations. It highlights how they feed one another, with operations producing information that, once developed into actionable intelligence, facilitates more operations. Conversely, poor intelligence leads to ineffective operations.⁶¹

The U.S. Army learned that intelligence-driven operations led to successful counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines, and successfully applied the concept again during the U.S. Army’s expeditions in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 1918 to 1920. The 27th and 31st U.S. Infantry Regiments developed battalion intelligence sections and established an intelligence school. Graduates from the intelligence school, known as “intelligence scouts,” played a key role during operations, enabling their units to clear insurgents from the communist sanctuary in the Suchan Valley in only two months, killing 500 guerillas in the process.⁶²

Two other U.S. Army doctrinal references specifically mention intelligence at the company-level: the initial draft of *Field Manual 2-01, ISR Synchronization*, and *Field Manual 2-19.4, Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*. Published in 2008 and 2009 respectively, these manuals acknowledge that units currently employ CoISTs with the intent of improving timely processing of information, coordination, and synchronization of ISR assets. The draft *Field Manual 2-01* posits that creation of intelligence products occurs at every echelon from the tactical to the strategic.⁶³ *Field Manual 2-19.4* points out that the Army’s recent changes in

⁶⁰ Stew Magnuson, "Eyes Wide Open: Army Wants to Make 'Every Soldier a Sensor'," *National Defense* 91, no. 642 (2007): 45.

⁶¹ *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 3-1.

⁶² Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 225.

⁶³ U.S. Army, *Field Manual (Initial) 2-01 [Draft] ISR Synchronization*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), 2-13, 3-17; U.S. Army, *Field Manual 2-19.4 Brigade*

intelligence-driven operations created the conditions for further intelligence transformation. This same manual highlights the effectiveness of higher-echelon intelligence assets known as quick reaction capabilities (QRC), when utilized at the tactical level, demonstrating the potential benefits of forming CoISTs in as many operational organizations as possible. The QRC capabilities commonly utilized by companies include unmanned ground sensors, weapons intelligence teams, SIGINT terminal guidance, detainee handling and processing, data exploitation and document and media exploitation.⁶⁴

Despite a lack of doctrinal references to guide their efforts, numerous units across the U.S. Army have followed the general advice provided by *Field Manual 3-24*, creating an intelligence cell at the company-level to facilitate the synchronization of operations and intelligence.⁶⁵ Innovations in the field often precede updates to doctrinal publications. Therefore, company-level leaders in today's counterinsurgencies unsurprisingly turn to other sources for guidance on company-level intelligence sections.

Recent Developments in Counterinsurgency Thinking

In earlier, conventional wars, higher echelon intelligence sections typically determined the locations of the opposing force's military units using a variety of sophisticated data collectors and then provided this intelligence to subordinate units. Armed with this intelligence, subordinate units would then execute their orders. While appropriate in conventional scenarios, top-down intelligence methods function poorly in counterinsurgencies, in which all units collect and report

Combat Team Intelligence Operations, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1-5.

⁶⁴ Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, "ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 50 (2008): 54; *Field Manual 2-19.4 Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations*, 1-5.

⁶⁵ U.S. Army, *Training Circular 2-19.63 Company Intelligence Support Team*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010); *Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence*, III-14.

information, making the optimal intelligence flow in counterinsurgencies bottom-up rather than top-down.⁶⁶

Units conducting counterinsurgency missions face an enemy that is ever evolving and often unpredictable. In 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker initiated 17 “Focus Areas” for change as part of the overall Army transformation process. Focus Area 16, “Actionable Intelligence,” acknowledged the reality that every soldier both produces and consumes intelligence.⁶⁷ The Army acted on General Schoomaker’s guidance in dealing with the adaptive and evolving enemies it faced by introducing the concept of “Every Soldier a Sensor.” With this concept, the Army sought to inculcate “tactical curiosity” in soldiers at all levels across the force and significantly enhance reporting from the bottom-up.⁶⁸ The acknowledgement of the importance of individual soldiers and the deliberate training they received formed part of the U.S. Army’s overall enhancement of the availability of actionable intelligence to operational units.

Many view Dr. David Kilcullen, a former Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel and infantryman, as one of the leading experts on COIN in the current operating environment. Building on his background and fieldwork in anthropology, he has served in counterinsurgencies in various parts of the world, writing numerous articles and books on his diverse experiences. Kilcullen served in Australia’s Defense Department as an analyst for the Office of National Assessments, worked for the U.S. Department of Defense drafting the *2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, served as the chief counter-terrorism strategist for the U.S. Department of State, and acted as General David Petraeus’s senior counterinsurgency expert and as an advisor to

⁶⁶ *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 3-25.

⁶⁷ Stephen K. Iwicki, “Csa's Focus Area 16: Actionable Intelligence: National Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 30, no. 3 (2004): 71.

⁶⁸ Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2007,” (Washington, DC2007), P-1.

General Stanley McChrystal.⁶⁹ He also contributed to the writing of *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*.⁷⁰

Kilcullen provides recommendations and sound advice to company-level commanders in his 2006 paper "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency."⁷¹ This article provides advice that helps company-level commanders as they prepare for deployments to either Iraq or Afghanistan, providing links to theory, history, and doctrine.⁷² In a particularly relevant section of this article, titled "Organize for Intelligence," Kilcullen posits that daily tactical activities will lead to the collection of large amounts of information, and the companies and platoons that generate this information will need their own intelligence sections to conduct the necessary analysis at their level to turn it into actionable intelligence.⁷³ Kilcullen's advice mirrors early French counterinsurgency author David Galula's concept of increasing opportunities for individual contact with the population in order to multiply opportunities to gain intelligence.⁷⁴

Kilcullen also emphasizes the importance of intelligence-led operations to operational and strategic leaders.⁷⁵ In a presentation at the U.S. Marine Corp's Small Wars Center of Excellence, Kilcullen discussed the relatively greater importance of intelligence in an insurgency

⁶⁹ George Packer, "Knowing the Enemy; a Reporter at Large," *The New Yorker* 82, no. 42 (2006).

⁷⁰ Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 17.

⁷¹ David Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles': Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (2006): 103-08.

⁷² Ibid., 103.

⁷³ Ibid., 104.

⁷⁴ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 84.

⁷⁵ Packer, "Knowing the Enemy; a Reporter at Large," 1-5.

as compared to conventional operations.⁷⁶ He also frequently highlights the importance of population-focused intelligence in COIN, and the fact that lower-level units require access to HUMINT and SIGINT assets that often reside in division and corps headquarters. Further, in his 2004 article “Countering Global Insurgency,” Kilcullen outlines the importance of tailored systems analysis in COIN and the demand of intelligence collection and analysis at the lowest tactical level.⁷⁷

Two other contributing authors to *Field Manual 3-24*, Kyle Teamey and Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Sweet, wrote an article titled “Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency,” published in *Military Review* in 2006. In the article, Teamey and Sweet discuss the importance of intelligence in every military operation, but they emphasize the requirement of local intelligence for mission success in counterinsurgencies. In their discussion of intelligence in COIN, Teamey and Sweet present six “Intelligence Principles for Counterinsurgency” that demonstrate how intelligence requirements differ in COIN from those in other types of warfare. A central theme underpins these principles: “counterinsurgency is an intelligence war.”⁷⁸ Teamey and Sweet posit that an intelligence system organized for major theater warfare instead of COIN operations impedes successful intelligence gathering in counterinsurgencies. Teamey and Sweet articulate the need for organizations to change to meet the reality that all organizations from the company-level up operate in a joint and combined environment. In this environment, units must “coordinate intelligence collection and analysis with coalition and host-nation militaries and intelligence services and with many different U.S. intelligence organizations.”⁷⁹

⁷⁶ David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice,” in *Counterinsurgency Seminar 07*, ed. United States Marine Corps Small Wars Center of Excellence (Quantico, 2007), 48.

⁷⁷ David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *Small Wars Journal* (2004), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf> (accessed October 21, 2010).

⁷⁸ Teamey and Sweet, “Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency,” 24.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

The Initial American Military Response

It remains uncertain who first reintroduced the concept of using an intelligence section at the company-level. MAJ Bill Benson and CPT Sean Nowlan discussed reforming the tactical intelligence sections at the battalion level as early as June 2003. However, they did not find a publisher for their ideas until the fall of 2004.⁸⁰ That same year, the U.S. Marine Corps also identified the requirement to modify the intelligence organization to support Marine rifle companies. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory published a pamphlet in 2004 providing initial guidance on how a Marine rifle company could create and implement a Company-Level Intelligence Cell (CIC).⁸¹ The Marine Corps soon began implementing this concept.

Marine Major John D. Heye proved instrumental in the Marine Corps's development of the CIC. As the intelligence officer for 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, in 2006 Major Heye organized a CIC in each company, and published notes on the concept for his fellow Marines, highlighting its successes.⁸² In his notes, Heye recommends that the CIC consist of six hand-selected Marines with exceptional analytical skills. Heye's description of the CIC successes highlights how one Marine created his own web-based database that was as easy to update as a MySpace account.⁸³ Major Heye's influence concerning CICs continued with his assignment as the Company-Level Intelligence Cell Action Officer at the Marine Corps Intelligence Schools. The USMC Intelligence Schools offer a ten-day program of instruction for Marines slated to work

⁸⁰ Bill Benson and Sean Nowlan, "Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq: Restructuring Battalion Intelligence to Win," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 30, no. 4 (2004): 8.

⁸¹ Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, "X-File 2-1.1 Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)," (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2004).

⁸² John D Heye, "Company Intelligence Cell Comments," (2007), <https://www.intelink.gov/inteldocs/view.php?fDocumentId=258046> (accessed October 11, 2010). Registration required for access to Intelink.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 7.

in an intelligence cell.⁸⁴ Before long, the Army saw the potential of CICs and began to explore the concept.

In 2007 the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), submitted a recommendation to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICOE) for the creation of a CIC; the first such recommendation by an Army organization.⁸⁵ While USAICOE conducted their formal research into the requirements, AWG continued field research with units in Iraq and Afghanistan, trained units deploying to theater and deployed units of their own, and published a Tactical Reference Guide concerning CICs that it distributed throughout the U.S. Army. The AWG recommended assigning four to six personnel to these CICs, and recommended specific intelligence gathering and processing techniques consistent with those found in the USMC pamphlet, *Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)*.⁸⁶

The USAICOE, as a member of the Pentagon's INTELST email list server, followed members' discussions concerning the need for an intelligence capability at the maneuver company level. Considering input from INTELST and the AWG, and exploring similar concepts by the U.S. Marine Corps, USAICOE conducted a limited assessment of the requirements using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct.⁸⁷ The USAICOE submitted a concept paper in July 2007 to leaders across the U.S. Army entitled "Intelligence Support Teams: Supporting Tactical Intelligence Requirements" and solicited feedback from units and leaders. The concept paper discussed the requirements of

⁸⁴ John D Heye, "USMC Company-Level Intelligence Cell Overview,"(2008), <https://www.intelink.gov/inteldocs/view.php?fDocumentId=258028>(accessed October 11, 2010).

⁸⁵ U.S Army Intelligence Center of Excellence USAICOE, email, August 2, 2010.

⁸⁶ Asymmetric Warfare Group AWG, "Tactical Reference Guide: Company Intelligence Cell," (Fort Meade, MD: AWG, Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2007); U.S. Marine Corps, *X-File 2-1.1 Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2004).

⁸⁷ Rich Holden, "The Intelst Forum: Collaboration Via Email," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 34, no. 1 (2008): 38.

intelligence support teams (IST) in a full spectrum environment at the company level and provided vignettes showing how an IST would support offense, defense, and stability operations.⁸⁸

While USAICOE conducted their DOTMLPF review on the CIC concept, units in the field began to experiment on their own and with assistance from AWG through mentorship and training. In an *Army Magazine* article titled “Company-level IPB” six current and former company-level commanders echoed the need for companies to create an organic intelligence cell. These commanders describe how they faced situations on the ground daily that did not match the templates provided by battalion-level intelligence sections. They had to conduct their own analysis and provide bottom-up feedback to their higher headquarters.⁸⁹ Other company-level leaders published articles echoing this theme in hope for organizational change within the U.S. Army.⁹⁰

British Army Counterinsurgency Experience in Northern Ireland

Many historians and COIN experts have studied the British experience fighting the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland, which began an insurgency in 1969.⁹¹ Like many military organizations, the British Army lacked a fully developed COIN strategy at the onset of hostilities in 1969 and had to modify its organizations and actions to meet the reality of the situation. The lack of intelligence capability stood out as an early shortcoming in

⁸⁸ U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca USAIC & FH, "Concept Paper Intelligence Support Teams: Supporting Tactical Intelligence Requirements," (Fort Huachuca, 2007).

⁸⁹ CompanyCommand, "Company-Level IPB," *Army* 56, no. 6 (2006): 58-60.

⁹⁰ Philip K. S. Sprincin, "Rethinking the 'Rifle' Company," *Marine Corps Gazette* 91(2007); Dinsmore, "Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency Operations."; Frizzelle et al., "Dragoons in Iraq: Combined Census Operations."; Wayne Hennessy-Barrett, "Company Level Tactical Intelligence and Targeting," *Small Wars Journal* (2009); Rory M. McGovern, "Organize for Intelligence: Company Intelligence Cells in COIN," *FIRES* (2008).

⁹¹ Desmond Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984* (London: Methuen, 1985).

British Army operations.⁹² As Brian A. Jackson points out: “Over the course of the conflict, security and intelligence organizations adapted by studying the overall effects of their actions and learning from each engagement. In time they became extremely successful.”⁹³ Martin Van Creveld posits that the British Army’s success against the PIRA in Northern Ireland stands out as one of the few case studies highlighting military defeat of an insurgency.⁹⁴ The British Army’s success in Northern Ireland, despite the many challenges it faced, make this an ideal case study for evaluating current intelligence operations by comparison to those the British Army developed during this conflict.

Over the decades, numerous intelligence agencies and organizations participated in the struggle in Northern Ireland. Mark Urban, in his book *Big Boys’ Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, highlights eighteen units involved in intelligence activities from 1969-1983.⁹⁵ The British Army’s intelligence integration with these various organizations, ranging from the tactical to strategic levels, emerged as a key element of their eventual success. British historian Desmond Hamill argues, “Overall, the intelligence scene was gloomy. The lessons learned in Kenya, Aden, Malaysia and even in the campaign in Ireland between 1919 and 1922 had been forgotten or ignored.”⁹⁶ The British Army synchronized the intelligence efforts of the Royal Ulster Constabulary police (RUC), military organizations, and national level intelligence agencies including MI5 (Security Service) and MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service) to defeat the PIRA.⁹⁷

⁹² John Kiszely, "Learning About Counter-Insurgency," *RUSI Journal* 151, no. 6 (2006): 18.

⁹³ Brian A. Jackson, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War" the British Experience in Northern Ireland," *Military Review* 87, no. 1 (2007): 75.

⁹⁴ Martin L. Van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq*, 1st ed. (New York: Presidio Press, 2006), 229.

⁹⁵ Mark Urban, *Big Boys’ Rules: The Secret Struggle against the IRA* (London: Faber, 1992), 255.

⁹⁶ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, 69.

⁹⁷ Jackson, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War" the British Experience in Northern Ireland," 75.

Dr. Brian Jackson's article, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War" The British Experience in Northern Ireland," shows how the British military improved their analytical capability by increasing the number of soldiers allocated to analysis and intelligence collection.⁹⁸ Initially, battalion level units deployed to Northern Ireland, each with its organic intelligence section. These sections consisted of only six men. However, the British Army soon decided that this was entirely too small and plans were made to expand the section into a large office organization.⁹⁹

The British Army increased the number of analysts as a way to improve upon the poor quality of information and intelligence available from the RUC prior to the large-scale internment operations of August 1971.¹⁰⁰ As Desmond Hamill recalls, "A company commander in Londonderry found that his men had few of the right names and addresses. Often the man they wanted lived next door to the house they tried."¹⁰¹

Dismounted and vehicular patrolling proved crucial to the British military for intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland, just as it would to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁰² According to Michael Dewar, "Patrolling in Northern Ireland has two main purposes: domination of the ground, so as to deny the enemy freedom of movement and, secondly, to get to know the area intimately in order to build up a detailed knowledge of the area and its inhabitants."¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Ibid., 76.

⁹⁹ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, 134-35.

¹⁰⁰ Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace* (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996), 149-50.

¹⁰¹ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, 60.

¹⁰² Robert Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (2005): 58; Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, 74.

¹⁰³ Michael Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland* (London: Arms and Armour, 1985), 180.

Typically, a company was responsible for a large area with a population 25,000 or more.¹⁰⁴

Throughout these patrols, company commanders gave their patrols specific intelligence requirements to answer.¹⁰⁵

These patrols conducted census operations akin to “close encounter” operations conducted in Iraq.¹⁰⁶ However, the British Army’s method of conducting home searches impeded their ability to win the “hearts and minds” of the populace because many viewed them as overly intrusive. By some accounts, they searched every house in Northern Ireland at least twice.¹⁰⁷ Patrols would gather information about each individual residing at each residence, photograph the residents, and even noted the color of paint on the living room walls.¹⁰⁸

Upon returning from each patrol, the men would debrief their company commander.¹⁰⁹ Due to the volume of these debriefs, the British Army created company intelligence sections to assist the company commanders in analyzing the data. In *The British Army in Ulster*, David Barzilay writes, “A patrol never ended up at the main gate. We would get a quick cup of tea, have a cigarette and in a relaxed atmosphere the patrol would be discussed and every piece of relevant information written down and passed on to the company intelligence section.”

These intelligence sections would “weave intelligence data together into a coherent picture.”¹¹⁰ The intelligence section entered much of the data collected by patrols into a variety of databases, named according to the type of data they contained. For example, the Vengeful

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 180-81.

¹⁰⁵ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, 121.

¹⁰⁶ James R. Crider, "A View from inside the Surge," *Military Review* 89, no. 2 (2009): 84-86.

¹⁰⁷ Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 3 (2009): 456.

¹⁰⁸ Hamill, *Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984*, 140.

¹⁰⁹ Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland*, 182-83.

¹¹⁰ Jackson, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War" the British Experience in Northern Ireland," 81.

database contained data on vehicles, while Crucible contained data on individuals.¹¹¹ This concept is similar to the U.S. military's present-day use of the Tactical Ground Reporting system (TIGR). TIGR, a web-based patrol-level tool, offers a unique multimedia perspective of the battlefield to individual soldiers as well as their higher headquarters. TIGR aggregates information by providing company-level soldiers the ability to upload patrol debriefs and create reports on data collected from patrols. This data is stored in a system that is searchable and connected to other databases.¹¹² Similar to the Vengeful and Crucible systems, TIGR's databases contain data garnered from census operations, including occupant's information, pictures, and vehicle data.¹¹³



Figure 1: Screen shot of TIGR photo courtesy of DARPA

¹¹¹ Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 158.

¹¹² Spencer Brown, "Tactical Ground Reporting Improves Operational Picture," *Army Sustainment* 42, no. 3 (2010): 46-47.

¹¹³ Frizzelle et al., "Dragoons in Iraq: Combined Census Operations," 44.

The concept of a company intelligence cell remains an integral part of current British Army doctrine and practice. British Army Major Wayne Hennessy-Barrett, a former company commander in Kabul, Afghanistan reminds us that: "The best source of actionable intelligence comes from the company's own patrols and the relationships they make with the local communities and like-minded allies and neighbours, be they non-governmental organisations, private security companies or coalition partners."¹¹⁴ He also advises that the best and brightest non-commissioned officers and soldiers (guardsmen) should staff intelligence cells. The British Ministry of Defence reinforces these concepts in its Army Field Manual, *Countering Insurgency*, by codifying many of these lessons and others from a report titled: *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*.¹¹⁵

Both the Canadian and Australian Armies currently use company intelligence cells. The Canadian Army applied the lessons of the British Army's experience in Northern Ireland when they began integrating intelligence personnel down to the company level during deployments to East Timor and Ethiopia prior to September 11, 2001.¹¹⁶ The Canadian Army continued the use of company intelligence cells through their deployments to Afghanistan, increasing their company headquarters staff to include two captains in addition to the analysts to strengthen the staff's support of the commander and the company.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Hennessy-Barrett, "Company Level Tactical Intelligence and Targeting," 2.

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Defence, *British Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency*, (London: Ministry of Defence, 2009); General Sir Mike Jackson, "Operation Banner an Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland," (London: Ministry of Defence, 2006).

¹¹⁶ Warrant Officer M.R. Tracey, "Information Operations - How Important Is HUMINT or HUMINT - Who Knows the Truth," *The Bulletin* Vol. 8, no. 2 (2001).

¹¹⁷ Jason T. Adair, "Learning on the Run: Company Level Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan," *The Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 4 (2008): 1-20.

Analysis of Tactical Level Units' Responses to the Need for Intelligence Capability

In almost every war a field intelligence system has been built up and brought to great efficiency only to be disbanded when the shooting stopped.

—Chetwynd John Drake Haswell, *British Military Intelligence*

More than thirty authors of books and articles written over the last seven years have recommended enhancing the intelligence capacity in tactical units at the company/troop/battery level. Many of these authors provide insights for higher echelon units to consider based on their experiences employing a Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST), Company-Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC), Company Intelligence Cell (CIC), or Intelligence Support Team (IST). Regardless of the name for the intelligence section, leaders across both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps from the ranks of Staff Sergeant to Lieutenant General; and leaders at levels ranging from platoon leader up to brigade commander have added to the current discourse.¹¹⁸ This discourse, along with insight gleaned from various other sources and interviews, highlights several critical areas as consistent themes: staffing the CoIST, equipping the CoIST, tasks and products produced by the CoIST, training the CoIST, and integration of HUMINT collectors.

Staffing or Manning the CoIST

Current Army manning documents do not authorize the staffing of companies, troops, and batteries for company intelligence support team (CoIST) operations.¹¹⁹ However, an ongoing Headquarters, Department of the Army force design update will eventually address some of the

¹¹⁸ Foley, "Facilitating Intelligence at the Point of Action."; Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, "Fixing Intel in Afghanistan."; Baird, "COIN: On-the-Job Learning for the New Platoon Leader."; Harry D. Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff," *Infantry* 98, no. 1 (2009).

¹¹⁹ ———, "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff," 8-9; "Handbook No. 10-20 Company Intelligence Support Team, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures," (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2010).

personnel concerns associated with manning and fielding CoISTs.¹²⁰ This bureaucratic process may take several years to come to fruition. However, this does not result from simple bureaucratic inefficiency, but from the difficult decisions related to staffing CoISTs appropriately. Every soldier or leader reassigned to a CoIST reduces the number of personnel available for patrols, providing security, serving as part of a quick-reaction force, or conducting a myriad of other combat duties.¹²¹ Nevertheless, many company-level commanders with recent combat experience understand the importance of the CoIST, and believe the benefits associated with resourcing it internally outweigh the costs.¹²²

The CoIST benefits not only the company-level unit it supports directly, but also neighboring and higher echelon units. The CoIST must possess the ability to collect, analyze, and synthesize large amounts of information into clear products that will assist the company-level commander in his or her decision-making. Because of the vast impact the CoIST can have on its unit's effectiveness, it must maintain an active relationship with its battalion-level intelligence officer (S-2) to ensure success across the entire area of operations.¹²³

The small size of the typical battalion-level S-2 section makes it difficult to staff the CoIST directly with Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) 35F Intelligence Analysts.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the S-2 section must put forth tremendous effort to support the CoIST processes. The current Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for brigade and

¹²⁰ James Callahan, *Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Council of Colonels* (Fort Huachuca, AZ: USAICOE, 2009), PowerPoint presentation.

¹²¹ David Liebmman et al., "COIN and Company Fusion Cell Operations," *Infantry* 99, no. 1 (2010): 26-30; "Handbook No. 10-20 Company Intelligence Support Team, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures."

¹²² CompanyCommand, "Key Topic #3: Company Intel Support Team (2/25 SBCT, Iraq)," (2010).

¹²³ Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff," 8-11.

¹²⁴ MOS 35F Intelligence Analyst is primarily responsible for supervising, coordinating, and participating in the analysis, processing and distribution of strategic and tactical intelligence.

battalion/squadron S-2 sections (Figure 2) clearly depicts how few intelligence analysts reside within the brigade and battalion. This limitation makes it necessary to take soldiers “out of hide” (e.g. reassign soldiers from other duties in their company-level unit to staff the CoIST).




Figure 2: Intelligence Personnel in the Brigade Combat Team¹²⁵

The company-level commander and first sergeant are key players in every aspect of their unit’s operations. Thus, they play a major role in decisions regarding staffing, structure, and integration of the CoIST.¹²⁶ The commander, first sergeant, and other subordinate leaders at the platoon level can enhance the abilities of the CoIST by selecting the best-qualified soldiers to

¹²⁵ Data for this figure created from Force Management System Web Site available at: <https://fmsweb.army.mil> (accessed October 11, 2010).

¹²⁶ Sprincin, "Rethinking the 'Rifle' Company," 52-58; Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff."; Baird, "COIN: On-the-Job Learning for the New Platoon Leader."

work in the CoIST from within the unit ranks. The qualities the soldiers should possess remain a subject of great debate within the current discourse. However, trends in this discourse indicate that most individuals believe that the soldiers selected should minimally:¹²⁷

1. Possess or be eligible for a secret security clearance. (Top-Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) clearance for the NCOIC is preferred, though it may be difficult to acquire due to the lengthy approval process)
2. Possess strong analytical aptitude and have the ability to think, speak, and write clearly.
3. Possess strong computer skills and normal color vision.
4. Understand battle tracking and have an ability to organize information.
5. Understand how to work with intelligence system equipment and software.
6. Possess operational experience to understand what information is important and how to present it.

Additionally, the CoIST must have a sufficient number of personnel to conduct continuous 24-hour operations for an extended period of time (12-15 months). Numerous discussions about the correct number of personnel amongst various forums, doctrinal manuals, and articles recommend three to six soldiers to adequately staff a CoIST, but sufficient expert opinion exists to justify six personnel.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff."; CompanyCommand, "Key Topic #3: Company Intel Support Team (2/25 SBCT, Iraq)."; Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan."; Heye, "Company Intelligence Cell Comments."; Laboratory, "X-File 2-1.1 Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)."; Liebmann et al., "COIN and Company Fusion Cell Operations."

¹²⁸ Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency."; Liebmann et al., "COIN and Company Fusion Cell Operations."; Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan."; CompanyCommand, "Company-Level IPB."; Benson and Nowlan, "Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq: Restructuring Battalion Intelligence to Win."

The USMC also incorporates Company Intelligence Cells into its infantry companies.

Current USMC doctrine supports the majority Army opinion on personnel commitment: “You are well served to staff the intel cell with about six (6) Marines.”¹²⁹




Figure 3: USMC Company Level Intelligence Cell Organization¹³⁰

Mid-tour leave and casualty replacement requirements provide additional support for this staffing recommendation. A unit generally has ten percent of its soldiers on leave at any given time during a deployment. An appropriately resourced CoIST will still maintain adequate capability if manned with five of six members present. Additionally, the requirement to replace casualties may lead to reassignment of a CoIST leader back to the platoon level, which will cause less degradation of capability in a larger CoIST.

¹²⁹ X-File 2-1.1 Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO), 10.

¹³⁰ Modified from USMC CLIC briefing dated November 4, 2008, slide 16, available at: <http://ra.intelink.gov/> (accessed October 11, 2010), access restricted.

The six-member CoIST should include one non-commissioned officer (NCOIC) in the rank of staff sergeant (SSG) or greater, one analyst in the rank of sergeant, and four additional soldiers. Minimally, the NCOIC and the analyst must receive extensive training from the Fort Huachuca mobile training team (MTT) and from the BN/SQDN S-2 section, though preferably all members should receive this training. Selecting the staff sergeant will require special attention from the company commander and first sergeant. As the NCOIC of the CoIST, he must possess the maturity and experience to manage the team within the commander's guidance with limited oversight.¹³¹ Finding an experienced individual with sufficient time as a leader at this rank could prove the most difficult staffing challenge. The current trend of rapid promotion of the very best soldiers necessitates careful personnel management during the three years most soldiers spend with a unit before reassignment. The six-month deployment train-up period coupled with a twelve-to fifteen-month deployment will consume over half of a soldier's time in the unit. Commanders must also ensure that the CoIST leader has sufficient opportunity to serve in essential developmental positions; ideally, the NCOIC will already have gained this experience before selection as the CoIST leader. However, realities of today's personnel system will likely require replacement of the CoIST leader at some point during a deployment so leaders do not jeopardize their potential for promotion by denying them the opportunity to achieve basic branch qualification. To avoid unintentionally placing a CoIST NCOIC in jeopardy for promotion, the first Command Sergeant Major in the chain of command should approve NCO appointments to CoISTs.

Ongoing discourse and current CoIST Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) suggests that the six-member CoIST should consist of personnel from each platoon within the unit, for two reasons. First, each member reassigned from a platoon degrades its capabilities. Therefore, filling

¹³¹ CompanyCommand, "Key Topic #3: Company Intel Support Team (2/25 SBCT, Iraq)."

the CoIST from all platoons ensures none is disproportionately affected. Second, having members from each platoon will ensure that the CoIST remains representative of the entire organization. During patrol pre-briefs and de-briefs the CoIST staff and the platoons will share personal connections. This will minimize the “they-us” mentality that often occurs between a tactical unit and the staff that supports it.

Another point of contention revolves around whether Fire Support Team (FST) personnel should serve on the CoIST. Some company commanders and combat training center observers have argued that use of FST personnel to man CoISTs would lead to a degradation of field artillery skills.¹³² Others believe that FST personnel should manage the lethal and non-lethal effects for the commander and not become distracted by CoIST responsibilities. In particular, this debate focuses on the use of FST personnel to conduct and track all non-lethal effects to include key leader engagements, information-operation product requests, local contracting, and public affairs.

Analysis of 39 CoISTs from three brigade rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA provided the following insights. Fifteen CoISTs had one or more FST member assigned. When asked if this reduced the unit’s fire support capability nine (sixty percent) of the CoIST leaders and five (thirty-three percent) of the company commanders answered in the affirmative.

¹³² "CTC Trends Semi Annual 1-2QFY09 National Training Center (NTC)," ed. Combat Training Centers Branch Analysis Division (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2009); CompanyCommand, "Key Topic #3: Company Intel Support Team (2/25 SBCT, Iraq)."; McGovern, "Organize for Intelligence: Company Intelligence Cells in COIN."

Leader	Issue	Total (n=39)	BDE 1 (n=14)	BDE 2 (n=13)	BDE3 (n=12)
CoIST Leader	CoIST Manned with FST	15	5	3	7
CoIST Leader	Degrades Capability	9	3	3	3
Company Commander	CoIST Manned with FST	13	4	3	6
Company Commander	Degrades Capability	5	1	1	3

Figure 4: Frequency of CoISTs Manned with FST Personnel and Perceived Degradation by Brigade¹³³

However, others recognize the advantages of staffing the CoIST with FST personnel, which include greater CoIST emphasis on targeting and better integration with artillery and mortar fires.¹³⁴ These advantages may outweigh the disadvantage of a reduced capability to perform the primary FST fire support role when assigned other CoIST duties.¹³⁵ JRTC personnel frequently commented that staffing the CoIST with FST personnel might work well for a deployment in Iraq, where there has been less demand for indirect fire support, but not so well in Afghanistan, where artillery support remains a critical capability.¹³⁶

¹³³ William R. Sanders, "Company Intelligence Support Teams: An Assessment of Manning, Training, and Performance," (Fort Knox, Ky: U.S. Army Research Institute, 2009).

¹³⁴ Kyle Teamey, "Effects-Based Targeting at the Brigade," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 31, no. 3 (2005): 50-54; McGovern, "Organize for Intelligence: Company Intelligence Cells in COIN."; Hennessy-Barrett, "Company Level Tactical Intelligence and Targeting."

¹³⁵ "CTC Trends Semi Annual 1-2QFY09 National Training Center (NTC)."; Sanders, "Company Intelligence Support Teams: An Assessment of Manning, Training, and Performance."

¹³⁶ CompanyCommand, "Key Topic #3: Company Intel Support Team (2/25 SBCT, Iraq)."; Sanders, "Company Intelligence Support Teams: An Assessment of Manning, Training, and Performance."; Laboratory, "X-File 2-1.1 Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)."

The most frequently discussed sub-topic when considering staffing a CoIST concerns the number and type of intelligence personnel it should include. Members of numerous forums and the authors of many recent sources agree that a CoIST should contain military intelligence analysts (MOS 35F). Army Research Institute data collected from three brigades at the Joint Readiness Training Center posits that if BDE or BN intelligence analysts are available, CoIST leaders and company commanders will prefer their inclusion in CoISTs rather than a purely combat arms staff. Across all three brigades, fifteen percent of CoIST leaders and twenty-two percent of company commanders recommended adding an E4 MOS 35F to the CoIST, while sixteen percent of CoIST leaders and thirteen percent of company commanders recommended adding an E5 MOS 35F to the CoIST.¹³⁷




Figure 5: Percentage of CoIST personnel desired by MOS and rank

Survey data from the National Defense Intelligence College also supports a CoIST staffed with a combination of combat arms soldiers and intelligence analysts.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Sanders, "Company Intelligence Support Teams: An Assessment of Manning, Training, and Performance," 10.

¹³⁸ Paul Cuppett, "Insurgencies Are Local; Transforming the Military to Maximize the Intelligence Capabilities of Tactical Units in Order to Win the Strategic Counterinsurgency Fight" (National Defense Intelligence College, 2008).

Should the people in the Company Intelligence Cell be intelligence soldiers (MOS 35F), combat arms soldiers (11/19/13 MOS), or a combination of both MOS?		
A. Intelligence MOS (35F)	19	26%
B. Combat Arms MOS (11/19/13)	1	1%
C. Combination of both Intelligence and Combat Arms MOS	53	73%

Figure 6: CoIST staffing options survey results

Despite the interest for intelligence personnel integration in CoIST, the idea of assigning human intelligence collectors to a CoIST created uproar among many forum members.¹³⁹ Intelligence specialists criticize the concept of splitting up the members of a HUMINT collection team (HCT). However, company commanders require both analysts and collection assets, especially HUMINT collectors at their level.¹⁴⁰ HUMINT collectors at the company level create a voluminous amount of actionable intelligence.¹⁴¹ Analysts in the CoIST must synthesize information from patrol debriefs and reports with information collected by HCTs into company intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), which they then share with adjacent units and submit to the battalion-level intelligence section for further analysis and synthesis.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ "Should HCTs Be Split Up? Single HUMINT Collector in the CoIST." <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?id=1143424> (accessed October 28, 2010)

¹⁴⁰ David Beall, "The HUMINT Heresies: The Disposition of Human Intelligence Collection in Counterinsurgency," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 35, no. 2 (2009): 32.

¹⁴¹ Baker, "HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment," 12-21.

¹⁴² "35M's as CoIST Analysts?". <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1262789&lang=en-US> (accessed January 1, 2011)

Kyle Teamey and LTC Jonathan Sweet highlight how, in a counterinsurgency, the need to collect, analyze, and synthesize the vast amounts of information at the brigade level and below far exceeds the capacity of the traditional intelligence architecture, in which the preponderance of analysts work at the Division level and above. These authors argue for analysts and intelligence collectors (mainly HUMINT and SIGINT) at the company level. In Iraq and Afghanistan, platoons and companies produce the majority of the information about the insurgent network and the local populace through their daily contact with the population. This information not only drives operations from the bottom up but also creates the true understanding of that unique area of operations.¹⁴³

CPT Willie Lacks, an intelligence officer in 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry of 4/2 SBCT, suggests integrating a Human Intelligence Collection Team or HCT with the CoIST and fusing their efforts into weekly intelligence reports. This unique alignment integrates intelligence collectors and analysts at the CoIST level. This intelligence fusion facilitates synchronization of intelligence from the company level to the battalion/squadron level.

¹⁴³ Teamey and Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency," 26-27.

RSTA HCTs – Maximizing Organic HCTs




Figure 7: Integration of HCTs and CoIST in 2-1 Cavalry, 4/2 SBCT¹⁴⁴

Despite this example provided by CPT Lacks, many other CoISTs still consist mainly of personnel who lack formalized intelligence training.¹⁴⁵ The use of organic, non-intelligence trained personnel represents a growing trend – a workaround to meet the operational need for analysts at the company level.

In light of the increased need for HUMINT collectors and intelligence analysts at the lowest tactical levels, units across the Army and the branch centers of excellence requested a force design update (FDU) that would increase the MTOE authorizations of intelligence analysts at the battalion and company-level. The December 2007 proposal called for one staff sergeant

¹⁴⁴ Wallie Lacks, *RSTA HCTs - Maximizing Organic HCTs* (Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA: 2010).

¹⁴⁵ Teamey and Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency," 26.

analyst increase at the battalion level and for one analyst each at the rank of sergeant and specialist per company-level unit.¹⁴⁶ The approved FDU only added one 35M sergeant to each company CoIST for units deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan.¹⁴⁷ Further, this modification will remain temporary (e.g. it will not appear on unit MTOEs) until fiscal year (FY) 2012.

Teamey and Sweet applaud the U.S Army's modularization of Brigade Combat Teams and initial efforts to enhance intelligence capabilities in tactical units within the brigade.¹⁴⁸ However, they believe these new intelligence authorizations in the tactical units do not adequately deal with the problem, and point out that they do not match the U.S. Marine Corps' efforts, in which they doubled (and in some cases tripled) the size of battalion-level intelligence sections.¹⁴⁹ Units in the field continue to echo their reservations. During Stryker Symposium XIII, November 9-10, 2010, the lack of personnel, doctrine, and equipment for the Company Command Post and CoIST made the list of top ten issues presented from the Stryker Community of Practice, despite the recent increase from the Department of the Army.¹⁵⁰

Lieutenant General Richard Zahner, the Department of the Army G2, recommends a long-term military intelligence force modification. This modification, if approved, places two 35F intelligence analysts and one 35M HUMINT collector in the CoIST and significantly increases the HUMINT collectors in the BCT, allowing for a full four-man HCT to work at the company level.¹⁵¹ However, this current proposed increase is under review by the Army, and distribution of

¹⁴⁶ *Intel Support Team FDU 07-02*, (Fort Huachuca, AZ: USAICOE, 2007).

¹⁴⁷ Stephen J. Phillips, January 3, 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Teamey and Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency," 24-25.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

¹⁵⁰ Burton Shields, "Stryker Symposium XIII," (2010), Slide 11. Available at: <https://strykernet.army.mil/symposium/ssxiii/default.aspx> (accessed January 10, 2011).

¹⁵¹ Richard P. Zahner, "A Strategy to Rebalance the Army Mi Force," (Washington, DC: Army G2, 2009).

documents discussing this review is limited (LIMDIS).¹⁵² Nevertheless, the Department of the Army has apparently listened to the ongoing discourse and growing desire for further change within the intelligence community, and has sought to find new ways to support the needs of commanders, especially company-level commanders.

Equipping the CoIST

The slow-moving and complex framework of the Army acquisition system makes equipping the CoIST a difficult challenge to address. Despite the difficulties with resourcing, the equipment a CoIST needs links directly to the five critical functions they fulfill. The CoIST must:

1. Manage the company's lethal and non-lethal targeting.
2. Supervise the company's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) program.
3. Manage the patrol pre-brief/debrief process for the company.
4. Support detainee operations and biometric collection.
5. Support tactical site exploitation.¹⁵³

Intelligence organizations require the following basic equipment to process information into intelligence: computers, printers, power generation, and specialized software. Tactical units use computers daily during deployments to prepare for patrols, complete post patrol debriefs, and develop pictorial and graphical summaries of patrols or key events, commonly called storyboards.¹⁵⁴ These units utilize numerous specialized software programs: Combined Integrated

¹⁵² Phillips.

¹⁵³ Heye, "Company Intelligence Cell Comments."; *X-File 2-1.1 Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations (SASO)*.

; CompanyCommand, "Company-Level IPB."; Liebmann et al., "COIN and Company Fusion Cell Operations."; McGovern, "Organize for Intelligence: Company Intelligence Cells in COIN."

¹⁵⁴ Anonymous, "Leadership and Laptops on Combat Deployments," *Army* 59, no. 3 (2009): 100-10.

Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), TIGRNet, Falcon View[®], Planatir[®], Analyst Notebook[®], Google Earth[®], and ArcGIS[®].¹⁵⁵

Managing the company's lethal and non-lethal targeting process occupies most of the CoIST's time. Patrol debriefs represent an essential component of the targeting process. As patrols gather information about their areas they must catalog and store the vast amounts of information about the hostile personalities, ongoing and potential projects, and more friendly personalities worthy of further non-lethal engagement.¹⁵⁶ Prior to the availability of software at the lowest tactical units, patrols submitted written post-operative reports to battalion intelligence sections.¹⁵⁷ Most members of the distributed network lacked the ability to access these written reports. However, the development of software such as TIGRNet enhanced the ability to create and search a database filled with data, pictures, and other media.¹⁵⁸ While much of the census data collected by patrols and entered into TIGRNet may seem innocuous, it can help capture high-value targets earlier in the targeting process.¹⁵⁹

TIGRNet also shares information with CIDNE, a web-based program serving as U.S. Central Command's mandated intelligence repository, which resides on Secret IP Router Network (SIPRNet).¹⁶⁰ Numerous units provide information to the CIDNE portal: tactical, intelligence, law

¹⁵⁵ Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff."

¹⁵⁶ Dan Zeytoonian, "COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis," *Military Review* (2006): 188-92.

¹⁵⁷ Anonymous, "Leadership and Laptops on Combat Deployments," 100-04.

¹⁵⁸ David Talbot, "A Technology Surges: In Iraq, Soldiers Conducting Frontline Street Patrols Finally Get Software Tools That Let Them Share Findings and Plan Missions," *Technology Review* (Cambridge, Mass.) 111, no. 2 (2008): 70-71.

¹⁵⁹ Crider, "A View from inside the Surge," 81. LTC Crider's unit, 1-4 Cavalry, provides a great example of linking census operations to future apprehension missions.

¹⁶⁰ Christopher M. Fears, "Population-Centric Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette* 94, no. 11 (2010): 83.

enforcement, civil military and special operations.¹⁶¹ CIDNE contains an engagement tool for tracking three types of entities: people, facilities, and organizations. COIST analysts can plot data extracted from CIDNE onto maps to create current threat estimates and other intelligence products.¹⁶² This expands the CoISTs ability to gather information from other sources relevant to their lethal and non-lethal targeting cycle.

Despite the benefits TIGRNet and CIDNE provide to intelligence data collection and management, they lack many of the other analytical tools required by intelligence analysts. According to Lester Grau, an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, “association matrixes, network analysis, cultural analysis, genealogy, event-pattern analysis, language-pattern analysis, traffic-flow analysis, and financial-transaction analysis are police tools that should be staples of the intelligence effort in a counterinsurgency.”¹⁶³ Analysts routinely use link analysis and link-pattern analysis processes to great effect. The 4th Infantry Division used intelligence developed from link-pattern analysis to capture Saddam Hussein.¹⁶⁴ Two particular software programs, Planatir[®] and Analyst Notebook[®], support this type of analysis. These programs assist with targeting, ISR management, tactical site exploitation, and the patrol pre-briefing and debriefing process.

Biometric data collection also remains an important and time-consuming responsibility for CoISTs. Deployed units currently use two key systems to collect biometric data: the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT) and Hand-Held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 83.

¹⁶² Remso J. Martinez, "The 35 Things You Should Know before Deploying to Iraq as a Sustainment Brigade S2," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* VOL 34, no. 4 (2008): 9.

¹⁶³ Lester W. Grau, "Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis: Something Old, Something New," *Military Review* 84, no. 4 (2004): 43.

¹⁶⁴ Eric Maddox and Davin Seay, *Mission, Black List #1 : The inside Story of the Search for Saddam Hussein--as Told by the Soldier Who Masterminded His Capture* (New York: Harper, 2008), 137-220.

(HIIDE).¹⁶⁵ BAT and HIIDE support tactical site exploitation and targeting. The forensic data collected by these systems resides in a worldwide accessible database. The biometric and forensic data collected during tactical site exploitation refines the targeting process and facilitates criminal convictions, supporting the host country's rule of law.¹⁶⁶ CoIST's collection of biometric data and tactical site evidence greatly enhances the ability for higher-level analysts to refine insurgent networks and facilitate "left of boom" targeting.¹⁶⁷

In garrison, units can only use the BATs and HIIDE systems at the combat training centers (CTCs).¹⁶⁸ Though units experience a slight degradation of skill associated with the gap in usage from the CoIST Mobile Training Team (MTT) class to the CTC rotation, complete functionality returns quickly with these user-friendly systems. However, CoISTs can access the biometric analysis available on the SIPRNet through their S2 section.

USAICOE and the U.S Army G2 Intelligence Office developed a fielding plan to provide the necessary equipment to CoISTs while deployed. The fielding kit includes: four HIIDE devices, one BAT, a One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT), a cellular phone exploitation kit by CelleBrite, and Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) computers.¹⁶⁹ Additionally, USAICOE provides training sets at the three CTCs for use by units

¹⁶⁵ Jody Kieffer and Kevin Trissell, "DOD Biometrics-Lifting the Veil of Insurgent Identity," *Army AL&T* (2010): 14-16.

¹⁶⁶ David Turner. "CSI Baghdad' Uses Forensics to Combat IED Networks." Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, <http://www.dvidshub.net/news/24186/csi-baghdad-uses-forensics-combat-ied-networks> (accessed November 23, 2010)

¹⁶⁷ Rick Atkinson, "Left of Boom: The Struggle to Defeat Roadside Bombs," *Washington Post*, September 30, 2007. The vastness and complexity of the insurgent network have made it possible to target the networks themselves, and seek to disrupt attacks before they occur rather than mitigate the consequences afterwards. These "left of the boom" efforts have had a great deal of success.

¹⁶⁸ Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff," 12.

¹⁶⁹ Callahan, *Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Council of Colonels*; Stephen J. Bond, "What Is "DCGS-A"?", *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 30, no. 3 (2004). DCGS-A is an emerging MI system that will use information technology to consolidate the capabilities found in current ground stations. It is the ISR fusion and processing system. DCGS-A supports targeting,

during their pre-deployment validation exercise. However, many intelligence personnel have expressed their frustration that CoIST members lose much of the knowledge gained between the CTC rotation and deployment.¹⁷⁰ Although some CoISTs receive training with the requisite software for a week (months before going to a CTC), CoIST members lose much of the knowledge acquired between the class and the CTC rotation due to lack of access to the equipment and software at their garrison.

Until the U.S. Army implements a complete fielding plan that allows units to keep CoIST equipment while at their garrisons, it must find interim solutions. Although many of the software programs used for analysis by the CoIST require access to specialized computers, analysis-training can be conducted with more simplified versions of the tools, using the standard Microsoft Office® suite of software. Many commanders recommended that as units upgrade their normal office computers they work with their automations officers and unit property-book officers to keep some of the older computers within the organization for use by the CoIST.¹⁷¹ Units can covert these older computers over to the SIPRNet once deployed.

Utilizing Microsoft Office® software and the other freeware discussed previously, CoISTs can maintain their proficiency by creating products weekly during garrison training. For example, one CoIST from Vilseck analyzed the routes the company took each week to different training sites and ranges during the conduct of normal garrison training. Another CoIST from Fort Lewis analyzed the traffic tickets issued by the military police and conducted pattern analysis on “Tier 1 speed traps” much like a CoIST would do for Tier 1 IED hot spots while

ISR management, and synchronization (of organic and non-organic sensors) as well as the exploitation of information through automated and semi-automated fusion of information from multiple sources, and it provides analyst tools.

¹⁷⁰ Cuppett, "Insurgencies Are Local; Transforming the Military to Maximize the Intelligence Capabilities of Tactical Units in Order to Win the Strategic Counterinsurgency Fight"; Sanders, "Company Intelligence Support Teams: An Assessment of Manning, Training, and Performance."

¹⁷¹ Shields, "Stryker Symposium XIII."

deployed.¹⁷² Units completed these analyses using both Google Earth® and Falcon View®, which computer specialists installed on normal computers resident in the company while in garrison. Using Google Earth® and creating weekly overlays provide enough training to keep the CoIST familiar with inputting data into TIGRnet once deployed.

CoISTs operating in a remote environment have a critical need for connectivity. With the increased use of CoISTs to collect and analyze intelligence at the lowest level, units struggle to pass intelligence from the company to the battalion level and vice versa. While CoISTs have various digital systems, they have no dedicated communications architecture through which to pass information digitally to the battalion level via the SIPRNet. Though companies operating out of a forward operating base may have connectivity to the battalion, others in remote locations such as combat outposts or joint security sites often do not.¹⁷³ Battle-proven options include the SIPR/NIPR Access Point (SNAP) and Wireless Point to Point Link (WPPL) systems.¹⁷⁴ Both 2/25 SBCT and 5/2 SBCT employed Harris RF-7800W series radios in their CoISTs for SIPRNet access. This secure, wide-area network connectivity enables the CoIST to synchronize intelligence systems with battalion, brigade, division, and national level databases.¹⁷⁵ The below graphic portrays intelligence integration and site exploitation (SE) from the lowest tactical levels to national agencies.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff," 12.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Bristol, "Swiftlink-Bringing Broadband to the Battlefield," *Milsat Magazine* July-August 2010(2010): 70-75.

¹⁷⁵ "US Army Deploys Harris Broadband Ethernet Radios," *Microwave Journal* 51, no. 5 (2008).




Figure 8: Site Exploitation¹⁷⁶

The BN/SQDN S2 section can support the CoIST in garrison with access to equipment and software not currently available to the CoIST in garrison. The BN/SQDN S2 section has two assigned DCGS-A computers assigned and can provide limited access to CoISTs in garrison to maintain skills on specific programs such as Axis-Pro and ArcGIS®.¹⁷⁷ Commonly, S2 sections allow each company a two-hour block once a week (generally during the lunch hour to minimize impact on the S2 section's operations) for DCGS-A practice and access to SIPRNet. In addition

¹⁷⁶ Joseph M. Cox, "DOMEX: The Birth of a New Intelligence Discipline," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 36, no. 2 (2010): 26.

¹⁷⁷ Bond, "What Is "DCGS-A"?", 32-34. DCGS-A supports targeting, ISR management, and synchronization (of organic and non-organic sensors) as well as the exploitation of information through automated and semi-automated fusion of information from multiple sources, and it provides analyst tools.

to giving the CoIST the opportunity to train, this cooperation enhances support and the relationships between the CoIST and the S2 section.

Training the CoIST

Though current company-level manning documents do not authorize CoISTs, by 2007 the Department of the Army recognized the need to form CoISTs from personnel reallocated within existing units, and train CoIST personnel before deployments. In 2007, USAICOE developed a CoIST mobile training team (MTT) to provide a 40-hour program of instruction on the basics of intelligence analysis, pre-patrol briefings, de-briefings, and ISR synchronization; this MTT remains in existence today.¹⁷⁸ The USMC accomplishes similar training via MTT, but their training lasts for two weeks instead of the Army's one-week course.¹⁷⁹ USAICOE augments this training with "over the shoulder" training and mentoring during unit pre-deployment training exercises at the combat training centers (CTCs). Unfortunately, many units form CoISTs too close to the beginning of their upcoming deployment to benefit from the MTT training; these teams only receive training and mentorship at the CTC pre-deployment exercises.

Fort Lewis-based Stryker Brigades augmented their CoIST training to mitigate the impact of limited training observed elsewhere throughout the Army. 5/2 Stryker Brigade (SBCT) requires their CoIST members to attend several additional schools beyond the USAICOE MTT. For example, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the CoIST (the CoIST NCOIC) attends a five-week Stryker Brigade Battle Staff NCO course at Fort Benning. .

Further improving pre-deployment training, the Fort Lewis Foreign Language Training center created a ten-month Language Enabled Soldier (LES) course designed to provide extensive

¹⁷⁸ Callahan, *Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Council of Colonels*.

¹⁷⁹ Heye, "USMC Company-Level Intelligence Cell Overview." Slide 19.

Arabic language and cultural training based on requirements identified by 4/2 SBCT.¹⁸⁰ Later, 5/2 SBCT improved the curriculum by adding several elements to the already intensive language and cultural classes. These include a week of predictive profiling to recognize indicators in a threat situation; red team training to understand how non-Western thinkers make decisions; Arab media training to interact with media in short, focused messages; and, for at least one soldier per company, Mirror Image Training—a weeklong terrorism awareness class taught by Blackwater USA.¹⁸¹ In addition, Chameleon Associates teaches predictive profiling to selected soldiers prior to deployment.¹⁸²

The 5/2 SBCT LES program yielded 118 Soldiers trained in Arabic language and culture, or three percent of the brigade's strength.¹⁸³ According to Colonel Tunnell, 5/2 SBCT commander, "while this is enough to significantly improve intelligence capability at every echelon, it does not scratch the surface of the requirement for COIN... Twenty percent or more of the formation would probably need to be trained in Arabic to have the level of cultural understanding the Army's new COIN doctrine implies is essential."¹⁸⁴

Conclusion/Recommendations

Inverting the Intelligence Pyramid

While the literature on CoISTs does not indicate a fundamental change in the nature of war, it does highlight the unique requirements for intelligence collection and analysis in today's

¹⁸⁰ Harry D. I. V. Tunnell, "Developing a Unit Language Capability for War," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 51 (2008): 114-16.

¹⁸¹ Don Kramer, "Language Program Gets High Marks," *Army News*(2008), <http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/04/18/8595-language-program-gets-high-marks/>(accessed November 13, 2010). In 2008 Blackwater USA changed their name to Xe Services LLC.

¹⁸² "Predictive Profiling." Chameleon Associates, <http://www.chameleonassociates.com/predictiveprofiling.php> (accessed January 19, 2011)

¹⁸³ Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff," 11.

¹⁸⁴ Tunnell, "Developing a Unit Language Capability for War," 116.

wars. In particular, close interaction between Army units and local populations has led to the generation of vast amounts of information that platoons and companies both collect and exploit.¹⁸⁵ The lack of a dedicated company-level organization to process this information into actionable intelligence highlights the requirement for an adjustment in the current intelligence pyramid: the Army must invert the intelligence pyramid to achieve a bottom-up approach.

Intelligence sections must start at the base of the pyramid – the company level – made up of CoISTs augmented with HUMINT, SIGINT, and GEOINT assets. Numerous units have already modified their company-level organizations in accordance with this structure, but they have done so by reallocating internal assets, diminishing capabilities in other areas. Given that the benefit consistently justifies the cost, one should expect many other units to follow suit. In their 2005 *Military Review* article, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Major General Peter Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis discuss how they adjusted their intelligence systems to meet the needs of leaders and units at the platoon, company, and battalion level, thereby achieving success in their ongoing campaign in Iraq.

Our own C2 systems and process, oriented on providing clarity above, had to be turned upside down to focus on providing the tip of the spear with the information and actionable knowledge needed to determine the best course of action within the commander’s intent, guidance, rules of engagement, and law of land warfare.¹⁸⁶

The diagrams below graphically display a simplified version of General Chiarelli’s concept of inverting the intelligence pyramid:

¹⁸⁵ Jackson, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War" the British Experience in Northern Ireland," 81; Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force : The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

¹⁸⁶ Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85, no. 4 (2005): 16.




Figure 9: Traditional Intelligence Pyramid¹⁸⁷




Figure10: Proposed Inverted Intelligence System¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

Despite the U.S. Army's acknowledgement of the need for increased intelligence capacity at lower levels, it has failed to "invert the pyramid" as late as six years after publication of Chiarelli's article.¹⁸⁹ Its efforts to date consist of providing limited intelligence training for non-intelligence soldiers and providing limited equipment augmentation during deployments.

Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers operating in tactical units may recognize the need for creating CoISTs, but the current DOTMLPF approval process moves too slowly to enable Army-wide support for their formation. The ideal implementation of CoISTs requires a faster approval process, like the atypically rapid approval of *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency* or the procurement and fielding of commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS). These two examples of the Army's capability to approve essential programs rapidly demonstrate that similarly rapid fielding of CoISTs to deploying BCTs probably only requires adequate Army senior leader support. The formal creation of CoISTs will enhance the U.S. Army's ability to conduct operations during future conflicts, not only in COIN scenarios or in hybrid wars, but also in major combat operations. This fact stems from the ability of CoISTs to both enhance intelligence collection and exploitation at the company level, and improve integration of intelligence "bottom-up," from tactical units through echelons conducting operational art and managing theater strategy.

CoIST Manning

One cannot identify a single "optimal" CoIST configuration from existing data, largely due to the ad hoc nature of their current existence. However, research supports the permanent assignment of at least two military intelligence analysts to each CoIST. Given the current cap on

¹⁸⁹ Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, "Fixing Intel in Afghanistan," 66; Shields, "Stryker Symposium XIII."; Tunnell IV et al., "Manning, Training, Equipping a Company Battle Staff."; USAIC & FH, "Concept Paper Intelligence Support Teams: Supporting Tactical Intelligence Requirements."

personnel end-strength, this will likely require adjustments in combat arms units' organic personnel positions to provide the manning allocations for additional analysts. This adjustment presents more significant challenges to personnel-deficient armor and field artillery units than it does to infantry, engineer, and cavalry units, but an Army-level manning effort could overcome these challenges.

Furthermore, the optimal CoIST configuration, whatever its eventual personnel and resource allocations, must provide adequate flexibility to accommodate these various company-level unit types. Ideally, a standardized CoIST will consist of at least six personnel, including two MOS 35F intelligence analysts. Personnel from many branches – infantry, armor, cavalry, engineer, and field artillery – have served successfully as CoIST NCOICs. Therefore, current literature on CoISTs does not unanimously recommend the assignment of company fire-support-team personnel or members of any other specific branch to fill or lead the CoIST. However, research demonstrates a combat experienced soldier in the rank of staff sergeant or higher should serve as the CoIST NCOIC. When assigning any soldier to the CoIST, leaders must balance the requirements for continued development of basic branch and intelligence analysis skills to avoid limiting career progression opportunities for CoIST members. Further, since CoIST training takes time and valuable resources, company and battalion level leaders must ensure that MTT-trained personnel assigned to CoISTs continue to serve as CoIST personnel after their training and throughout deployment, pending replacement by similarly trained personnel.

CoIST Training and Doctrine

Five-day training sessions delivered by MTTs and “over-the-shoulder” training conducted at the CTCs currently serve as the primary sources of training for CoIST personnel. Training delivered by the CoIST MTT effectively builds an initial set of CoIST skills. However, CoISTs rapidly lose proficiency between MTT training and CTC rotations due to personnel turnover and lack of sustainment training. This requires development of additional training

methods and tools to sustain intelligence analysis skills while providing a means to integrate new personnel into the CoIST. The advanced training opportunities available at Fort Lewis should exist at every major Army installation. Additionally, MTT training should increase from one week to two weeks, following the USMC model, given the demonstrated benefit of this additional training time. Ultimately, USAICOE must implement a training program similar in scope and duration to the intelligence augmentation program available to Special Forces sergeants. Such training will provide units with scenarios and exercises that allow them to practice intelligence synthesis tasks. Installation Battle Command Training Centers (BCTC) should follow the Fort Lewis BCTC training model and provide this opportunity to resident units.

The USAICOE must refine other intelligence-oriented doctrine with the inclusion of CoISTs. These additions should delineate how CoISTs will improve the overall intelligence enterprise. Given the pace of recent changes and additions to intelligence doctrine, it seems feasible for USAICOE to accomplish this within two years.

Equipping the CoIST

The company-level headquarters must possess adequate equipment to accomplish the tasks and missions assigned to them by their higher headquarters. Unfortunately, recent headquarters equipment improvements stopped at the battalion level. The Program Executive Office Command Control Communications-Tactical (PEOC3T) should review the requirements of company-level organizations and equip them in the same manner as battalion-level organizations. Company-level units require power generation and environmental control units (air conditioning and heat) to sustain operations over extended periods. Two five-kilowatt generators and power-distribution systems will adequately power a company-level headquarters. Environmental control units require additional power, but several models have sufficient built-in generators. Additionally, a company-level headquarters requires a shelter or other structure from

which to operate. Numerous units use readily available shelters or tents; this requirement should pose no significant challenge to CoIST equipping.¹⁹⁰

PEOC3T and USAICOE should equip CoISTs with much of the same equipment currently fielded to battalion-level intelligence sections and operations centers. In particular, CoISTs require similar specialized analytical software and hardware. The current USAICOE deployment fielding kit suffices as a starting point, but ultimately the CoIST requires more equipment to accomplish its mission. The CoIST should possess five DCCGS-A computers, two OSRVTs for ISR synchronization, a large-scale plotter for mapping, two BATs computer systems, and other standard office equipment such as printers and plotters. The CoIST requires dedicated network access to connect these systems to the tactical internet. The SIPR/NIPR Access Point (SNAP) and Wireless Point to Point Link (WPPL) systems centered on the Harris RF-7800W series provide a battle-proven and readily available option.

Finally, a CoIST requires transportation platforms for equipment and personnel. The Stryker Command Variant already exists for use by Stryker Brigades, and a similar Bradley-based platform will suffice for Heavy Brigades. Infantry Brigades should consider a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) based platform similar to those currently fielded for Tactical Operations Centers at the battalion-level. Equipping CoISTs with dedicated vehicles ensures that they can operate while mobile or stationary.

CoISTs provide a significant, combat-proven intelligence capability where the Army needs it most – at the tactical, action-oriented level. However, the foregoing makes no claim that the widespread adoption of the CoIST will eliminate Clausewitzian fog and friction. Nevertheless, commanders at the company-level, and the commanders they work for, will benefit

¹⁹⁰ DRASH and Base-X currently provide this equipment to most battalion or larger sized units. Their products are available from www.drash.com or the General Services Administration.

from the reduction of the debilitating effect of this permanent characteristic of war. The many existing studies of CoISTs, both in the U.S. and in the British Army, and the relatively low cost compared to their benefit, demonstrate that the U.S. Army should invest in these organic intelligence analysis sections. Such an investment will improve the effectiveness of Army organizations from the bottom-up, inverting the pyramid to enable tactical units to assess and understand the complex environments in which they operate. In turn, higher echelon units will benefit from this increased understanding at the company level, and the dramatically increased rate at which they can attain that understanding and share it with higher echelons. The CoIST's time has come; it only remains for the Army to recognize and develop this proven capability. The analysis and recommendations above provide a starting point to enable the Army to man, equip, and train this critical intelligence capability.

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